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Abstract
Negotiations are ongoing to develop an international legally binding instrument (ILBI) under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the conservation and sustain-
able use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). If adopted, 
the ILBI will likely apply to parts of the Arctic Ocean where the Arctic Council has played an 
important role for ocean governance. This begs the question of what role the Arctic Council will 
play vis-à-vis a future ILBI, which is envisioned to “not undermine existing relevant legal instru-
ments and frameworks and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies” (UN General Assembly 
Resolution 72/249). Against this backdrop, this article reflects on the future relationship between 
the Arctic Council and the ILBI. In so doing, the article initially discusses possible meanings of 
the notion of not undermining and, more broadly, how the ILBI will likely determine its insti-
tutional relationship with relevant bodies for BBNJ. Based on that, the article provides a short 
overview of the role of the Arctic Council in Arctic Ocean governance and explores whether the 
Arctic Council would qualify as a relevant regional body that shall not be undermined by the 
future ILBI. 
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1 Introduction
The question of the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) has been under discussion for over 15 years. The 
existence of relevant legal gaps for the governance of areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion (ABNJ),1 and the related urgent need to develop norms and mechanisms aimed 
at protecting such vulnerable marine ecosystems was already recognised within the 
UN institutional setting during the 2003 meeting of the UN Open-ended Informal 
Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS).2 
This was followed by the decision of the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) in 2004 to establish an Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to 
study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ.3 This deci-
sion initiated what is now commonly referred to as the BBNJ process, which went 
through a preliminary4 and a preparatory5 phase before the UNGA launched a for-
mal intergovernmental conference (IGC) on 24 December 2017.6 The IGC has a 
mandate to address, “together and as a whole,” four substantive topics: (i) marine 
genetic resources (MGRs), including questions concerning the sharing of benefits; 
(ii) measures such as area-based management tools (ABMTs), including marine 
protected areas (MPAs); (iii) environmental impact assessments (EIAs); and (iv) 
capacity-building and the transfer of marine technology.7
The aim of the IGC is to develop an “international legally binding instrument 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national juris-
diction” (ILBI).8 While the BBNJ negotiations represent an important opportunity 
“to promote a dynamic, inclusive, and adaptive approach to oceans governance,”9 it 
was also stressed that “a major concern in negotiating the ILBI is the avoidance of 
the potential for fragmentation of the law and decision-making procedures.”10 And 
indeed, one key problem is how to integrate the future ILBI within an already crowded 
global and regional normative landscape, where many instruments, frameworks and 
bodies operate with complementary, overlapping and sometimes competing man-
dates. In this respect, UNGA, in setting out the mandate of the IGC, reaffirmed that 
“the work and results” of the IGC “should be fully consistent” with the provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).11 Additionally, 
and this is the central focus of this article, UNGA recognised that “this process and 
its result should not undermine existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks 
and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies.”12
The notion of not undermining, which appeared, in that particular formulation, 
rather late in the BBNJ process,13 and the problem of its interpretation is in many 
ways an important point of disagreement between countries that support a global 
approach to BBNJ governance, and those which, by contrast, favour a regional 
model. Despite the introduction of a third alternative – referred to as the hybrid 
approach14 – that should bridge these divergent points of view into a compromise 
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position, the concept of not undermining remains central to the negotiations. At 
the same time, however, its meaning remains affected by an “undeniably significant 
ambiguity.”15
The geographical focus of this article will be the Arctic, as this region is particu-
larly significant vis-à-vis the BBNJ negotiations for at least three reasons. First, the 
Arctic marine environment possesses a rich biodiversity; however, it is also extremely 
vulnerable to human activities and environmental change arising from both regional 
and global processes.16 Second, the Arctic may be significantly affected by the future 
ILBI, because it is a region where key legal and governance gaps exist (for exam-
ple, in relation to the topic of ABMTs, including MPAs).17 Third, the Arctic coastal 
States – Russia, the United States, Norway, Canada and Denmark with respect to 
Greenland – as well as other regional coastal States, such as Iceland, have always 
considered that UNCLOS provides, in principle, a sufficient framework for marine 
environmental governance in the Arctic.18 They have thus not been particularly in 
favour of a global approach to BBNJ governance throughout the BBNJ process.19 
The Arctic Ocean has thus far not been devoted specific attention at the BBNJ 
negotiations, though some scholars have started exploring the potential implications 
of the likely future applicability of the ILBI to some parts of the Arctic Ocean.20 For 
instance, Koivurova and Caddell described the “ILBI as a potential milestone in 
Arctic governance,”21 arguing that the Arctic Council, described as an intergovern-
mental “high level forum” tasked to facilitate cooperation on Arctic issues,22 “may 
provide particularly fertile ground for achieving the objectives of the ILBI within 
this region.”23 
Against this backdrop, this article aims at further investigating the role of the Arc-
tic Council vis-à-vis the future ILBI. One key question that arises in this regard is 
whether the Arctic Council qualifies as a relevant regional body that the future ILBI 
should not undermine.
The article will proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the notion of not under-
mining and what it may mean when applied to relevant bodies, as well as, more 
broadly, how the ILBI will likely determine its institutional relationship with relevant 
bodies. Section 3 then provides a short overview of the role of the Arctic Council in 
Arctic Ocean governance. Section 4 reflects on the relationship between the ILBI 
and the Arctic Council, and, in so doing, discusses whether the Arctic Council can 
be considered as a relevant regional body that shall not be undermined. Section 5 
offers some conclusions. 
2 The notion of not undermining
UNGA Resolution 72/249 stipulates, as mentioned above, that the BBNJ “process 
and its results should not undermine existing relevant legal instruments and frame-
works” as well as “relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies.”24 This normative 
criterion, first mentioned in the Report of the BBNJ Working Group (BBNJ WG) in 
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2014,25 was arguably “a manoeuvre to break a deadlock” among the delegations in 
terms of how the ILBI should be integrated normatively and institutionally within 
the existing framework for BBNJ.26 More specifically, the notion of not undermining 
is said to have emerged during the work of the BBNJ WG in relation to the perceived 
need, on the part of some delegations, to put in place a “safeguard” to ensure that 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (FSA),27 and the broader framework of international 
fisheries law with its system of regional fisheries management bodies would not be 
negatively affected by a future treaty.28 
The term undermine, which either means to “erode the base or foundation of (a 
rock formation)” or to “lessen the effectiveness, power, or ability of [something], 
especially gradually or insidiously,”29 is, however, not a “term of art.”30 Its semantic 
scope is broad and, as has been noted, “highly ambiguous.”31 This ambiguity may 
have allowed the BBNJ process to move forward during its early stages by accom-
modating varying views on how to integrate the future ILBI within the existing 
landscape of instruments, frameworks and bodies with relevant competence for the 
conservation of marine biodiversity in ABNJ.32 Yet, it has also prompted criticism in 
the literature,33 and it poses some problems in terms of how to manage the institu-
tional relationships between the ILBI and other instruments and bodies. While there 
have been a number of attempts at enucleating a precise meaning of the notion of 
not undermining,34 uncertainties remain as to its scope and implications, and there 
are likely to be even more complex issues at the time of its implementation.35
There are, additionally, different views on the role of the notion. Scanlon, for 
example, stressed the importance of the notion of not undermining for “defining 
the scope and function” of a future ILBI.36 By contrast, Oude Elferink suggested 
that “the role of the ‘not undermining’ requirement in the negotiations should not 
be over-estimated,” arguing that the terminology should not undermine in UNGA 
Resolution 72/249 “was acceptable to the various interests involved and certainly 
is flexible enough to justify different approaches to the institutional framework of 
the ILBI.”37 Oude Elferink further argued that, in this respect, “the design of the 
institutional framework of the ILBI will not be based on a specific interpretation of 
the term ‘not undermine’,”38 and predicted that the question of how to determine 
the relationship between the ILBI and other relevant instruments, frameworks and 
bodies will probably be addressed “in tandem” or after the BBNJ delegations have 
reached agreement on the institutional design of the ILBI.39
At the time of writing, neither the future institutional arrangements nor the ques-
tion of how the ILBI would determine its relationship to relevant legal instruments, 
frameworks and bodies have been settled. We will thus proceed on the tentative 
basis of the revised draft of the ILBI,40 which was circulated by the President of the 
Conference after the third session of the IGC. In terms of the future institutional 
arrangements of the ILBI, the revised draft text foresees the establishment of (1) a 
Conference of the Parties (COP); (2) a Scientific and Technical Body; (3) a Sec-
retariat and (4) a Clearing-House Mechanism in Articles 48–51, respectively. The 
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precise competences which those different institutional elements of the ILBI would 
be entrusted with is, however, still an open question. The revised draft text also 
contains several indications regarding the question of how the ILBI and its eventual 
institutional components would relate to other relevant legal instruments, frame-
works and bodies. A key provision in this regard is Article 4(3) of the revised draft 
text, which provides that:
[t]his Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in a manner that [respects the 
competences of and] does not undermine relevant legal instruments and frameworks 
and relevant global, regional, subregional and sectoral bodies. 
As a conflict clause,41 Article 4(3) would determine the normative and institutional rela-
tionship between the ILBI and other relevant instruments, frameworks and bodies.42 
In its current form, Article 4(3) notably uses the term undermine and if the final conflict 
clause in the ILBI does so as well, the term undermine and its interpretation will be of 
continuing relevance. 
Unlike UNGA Resolution 72/249, which used the wording “should not under-
mine,” Article 4(3) uses the wording “shall” in connection with the criterion of not 
undermining relevant instruments, frameworks and bodies. Hence, Article 4(3) 
would not be of recommendatory character, but formulates a legal obligation instead. 
That said, BBNJ delegations voiced different understandings of the meaning of not 
undermining during IGC I, II and III,43 which means that at the time of writing, it 
appears unlikely that the delegations will eventually agree on a specific meaning in 
the sense of Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (VCLT). 
The meaning of the term undermine in Article 4(3) of the revised draft text would 
thus have to be determined by interpreting this term primarily in light of its ordi-
nary meaning, context as well as object and purpose.44 While the first meaning of 
undermining, as already mentioned, refers to rock erosion, it is its second meaning, 
namely “to lessen the effectiveness, power, or ability of’ something,”45 that is the 
appropriate starting point with respect to this article.46 
Scanlon argued that this meaning offers only limited interpretative guidance, since 
the terms effectiveness, power and ability differ, which in turn begs the question 
of which term to rely on.47 In addition, she suggested the meaning of to undermine 
could be different in the context of legal instruments and frameworks, as opposed 
to relevant bodies.48 For instance, while not undermining a legal instrument could 
“suggest a requirement to not undermine the obliga-tions [sic] in that instrument,” 
she argued that not undermining a relevant body could in contrast require “respect-
ing its existing decisions, not creating an overlapping man-date [sic] or frustrating its 
ability to operate.”49 Here, Scanlon further suggested that, in the context of relevant 
bodies, the criterion of not undermining could either mean not to undermine “the 
authority or mandate of existing bodies” as well as the “measures” adopted under their 
auspices or instead merely not undermining “the effectiveness or objectives of existing 
frameworks and bodies.”50 These two divergent interpretations would in turn have 
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very different implications for the institutional relationship between the ILBI and 
any relevant global, regional or sectoral body. The first interpretation would protect 
the authority and mandate of relevant bodies vis-à-vis any future body under the 
ILBI, whereas the second interpretation’s focus on the effectiveness of relevant bod-
ies would not preclude future institutional elements/bodies under the ILBI to have 
an overlapping mandate or competence to adopt measures, so long as this would 
not undermine, i.e. lessen, the effectiveness of the relevant existing or future global, 
regional, subregional or sectoral body in question.51 Given its ambiguous character, 
the ordinary meaning of the notion thus only offers limited interpretative guidance, 
especially in relation to the identification of relevant bodies.
That said, the meaning of not undermining in Article 4(3) could be informed by 
how the term is used elsewhere in the revised draft text.52 For example, Article 15(4) 
of the revised draft text,53 which deals with international cooperation and coordi-
nation in the context of ABMTs, uses the term not to undermine specifically in 
the context of effectiveness, by stipulating that “[m]easures adopted in accordance 
with this Part shall not undermine the effectiveness of measures adopted by coastal 
States in adjacent areas within national jurisdiction.” Interpreting not undermining 
in  Article 4(3) to be directed at the effectiveness of relevant instruments, frameworks 
and bodies could also be supported by how the term to undermine is used in the 
FSA.54 Here, the notion is mainly used in the context of the effectiveness of conser-
vation and management measures,55 which could suggest a similar interpretation in 
the context of the BBNJ process focussing on the effectiveness of relevant instru-
ments, frameworks and bodies.56 Yet, in Article 15 of the revised draft text as well as 
in the FSA, the notion of not undermining is generally directed at the effectiveness 
of conservation measures and not in the context of “institutional competence.”57 In 
contrast, in UNGA Resolution 72/249 as well as in Article 4(3) of the revised draft 
text, the notion of not undermining has a broader scope, especially as it is applied to 
relevant bodies for BBNJ.58 This could militate against an interpretation that merely 
focuses on not undermining the effectiveness of relevant bodies for BBNJ.59 
Additionally, Article 4(3) includes, albeit in brackets,60 a requirement to apply 
and interpret the ILBI in a way that “respects the competence” of relevant global, 
regional, subregional and sectoral bodies. The inclusion of this additional require-
ment in a final conflict clause in the ILBI would evidently resolve the question of 
whether the notion of not undermining is directed at the mandate, authority or com-
petence of relevant bodies, or instead at their effectiveness. Whether a future conflict 
clause in the ILBI will include the explicit requirement of respecting the compe-
tence of relevant bodies for BBNJ is, however, far from settled. For instance, the 
Core Latin American Group (CLAM) commented on Article 4 of the revised draft 
text by emphasising the need for “legislative harmonization and the participation 
of other international instruments and organi[s]ations to ensure that there is no 
over-regulation or interference in other jurisdictions or competences.”61 To that end, 
the CLAM pointed out “that the key for achieving the mandate of not undermining 
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[was] […] to fully observe the competencies of the relevant forums, organisms and 
instruments” and supported the requirement to respect the competence of relevant 
bodies for BBNJ in Article 4(3) of the revised draft text.62 The United States also 
proposed, albeit without an explanation, to keep the requirement to respect the com-
petence of relevant bodies for BBNJ in Article 4(3) of the revised draft text.63 The 
International Chamber of Shipping went even further by suggesting that Article 4(3) 
should include the requirement to “fully” respect the competence of relevant bodies 
for BBNJ.64 Monaco, in contrast, suggested deleting the reference to respecting the 
competence of relevant bodies for BBNJ and instead including a direct reference to 
the effectiveness of relevant legal instruments, frameworks and bodies that should 
not be undermined.65 South Africa criticised Article 4 of the revised draft text more 
fundamentally,66 and instead indicated support for Article 4 of the first draft text:67
The current definition is not supported, as it has undergone deletion of previous text 
which was important. The text which was deleted was trying to achieve a very important 
aspect, namely that unless this treaty has priority when it comes to the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity, other legal instruments and bodies can still pursue 
their own agendas potentially to the detriment of the implementation of this agreement. 
[…] This treaty, to achieve its potential, needs to have priority when it comes to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in ABNJ.68
Finally, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) suggested to 
change the requirement to respect the competence of relevant bodies for BBNJ to a 
requirement that the future ILBI “shall be interpreted and applied in a manner that 
[…] promotes coherence and cooperation and does not undermine relevant legal 
instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional, subregional and sectoral 
bodies.”69
Given that the wording of a future conflict clause in the ILBI remains an open 
question, this matter will have to be further discussed by the delegations once the 
IGC resumes its work, possibly in 2021. Nonetheless, two comments appear note-
worthy at this point. First, too strict an interpretation of the requirement of not 
undermining may work against the very purpose of adopting a new treaty. South 
Africa emphasised precisely this aspect in a way that resonates with the observation 
made by Gjerde, Clark and Harden-Davies, namely by saying that “[f]or the new 
agreement to achieve its stated goal of conserving and sustainably using marine 
biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction, it must improve upon the 
status quo.”70 Additionally, institutional relationships built on the notion of not 
undermining may emphasise institutional conflicts and “turf wars,” though it may 
be more useful to emphasise the positive elements of coherence and cooperation, as 
increasingly suggested by commentators.71 
Even if the explicit requirement to respect the competence of relevant bodies is 
not be included in the final conflict clause, the following can be noted. So far, we 
have focused exclusively on how the notion of not undermining has been captured 
in Article 4(3) of the revised draft text as a tool to determine the normative and 
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institutional relationship between the ILBI and other relevant legal instruments, 
frameworks as well as relevant bodies for BBNJ. Yet, while Article 4(3) or a similar 
conflict clause in the ILBI would determine the relationship between the ILBI and 
relevant instruments, frameworks and bodies on a general level, the revised draft 
text also includes more specific provisions, which would be relevant for how the 
institutional components of the ILBI are envisioned to interact with other relevant 
bodies. For example, Article 48(4)(c) of the revised draft text would require a future 
COP to:
[p]romote cooperation and coordination with and among relevant legal instruments and 
frameworks and relevant global, regional, subregional and sectoral bodies, with a view 
to promoting coherence among efforts towards, and the harmonization of relevant policies 
and measures for, the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of 
areas beyond national jurisdiction [, including by establishing processes for cooperation 
and coordination with and among relevant global, regional, subregional and sectoral 
bodies] [, including by inviting other global, regional, subregional and sectoral bodies to 
establish processes for cooperation].72
Although Article 48(4)(c) still contains a lot of bracketed text, a similar provision 
in the final ILBI would determine more specifically, and in a more nuanced way, 
how the COP, as one of the potential institutional components of the ILBI, should 
interact with other relevant bodies. In this way, Article 48(4)(c) would arguably con-
stitute lex specialis vis-à-vis a general conflict clause, such as Article 4(3). It thus 
appears that the question of whether the notion of not undermining should be inter-
preted so as to be directed at the effectiveness or competence of relevant bodies for 
BBNJ would be of secondary importance if the final text for the ILBI were to include 
more specific provisions that determine how its individual institutional components 
should interact with other relevant bodies for BBNJ. In addition, specific provisions, 
such as Article 48(4)(c), could also inform the interpretation of the term not to 
undermine in a general conflict clause, such as Article 4(3) of the revised draft text. 
Of course, all the preceding analysis remains tentative, given that the negotiating 
process is ongoing. It remains far from clear when a new agreement will be adopted 
and whether it will contain the current draft articles, and, if so, in what form, given 
all the remaining brackets and the underlying disagreements. As illustrated above in 
relation to the revised draft text, some delegations have been consistently pushing 
for a well-defined recognition of the obligation of the ILBI not to undermine existing 
instruments, framework and bodies. Others, by contrast, have more broadly empha-
sized the need for enhanced cooperation, coordination and coherence among exist-
ing instruments, frameworks and bodies of the ILBI. This latter focus is important 
as it would emphasise the positive and collaborative relationship of the ILBI to other 
bodies and highlight potential synergies.73 Having offered a brief outline of the range 
of the meanings of and negotiating positions on the notion of not undermining, 
including the tensions between a negative and conflict-oriented and a positive and 
collaborative inflection of the notion, it is now time to turn our attention towards 
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the Arctic Council. The next section will discuss the role of the Arctic Council in 
Arctic governance, while the subsequent section will address a number of questions 
related to whether or not the Arctic Council is one of the bodies the ILBI should 
not undermine, as well as what role the Arctic Council may play in relation to Arctic 
governance once the ILBI is adopted.
3 The Arctic Council and Arctic Ocean Governance
The existing governance framework for the Arctic Ocean is complex, and consists of 
a web of global (e.g. UNCLOS and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD))74 
and regional instruments.75  The Arctic Ocean is therefore far from being “an inter-
national law vacuum.”76  Yet, as it lacks a “comprehensive regional regime,”77 regional 
cooperation in the Arctic has been, to a considerable degree, facilitated by the “soft 
power” of the Arctic Council.78 
The Arctic Council was established in 1996 by the non-legally binding 1996 
Ottawa Declaration as “a high level forum” with the aim to facilitate “cooperation, 
coordination and interaction […] on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of 
sustainable development and environmental protection,” while questions of “mil-
itary security” are explicitly excluded from its mandate.79 The Arctic Council has 
eight Member States, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the 
Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America.80 In addition, up 
to seven Arctic Indigenous peoples organisations can be accorded the status of Per-
manent Participants,81 as a means to ensure their “active participation and full con-
sultation,”82 whereas non-Arctic States, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary 
organisations as well as non-governmental organisations may be granted the status 
of observer.83 
The Arctic Council holds its ministerial meetings on a biennial basis, while the 
Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs), who are appointed by every member State of the 
Council, meet “at least twice a year.”84 Since 2013, the Arctic Council has appointed 
a permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway, which shall facilitate the activities of the 
Arctic Council, inter alia, by strengthening its “administrative capacity,” as well as 
“by providing continuity, institutional memory, [and] operational efficiency.”85 The 
bulk of the work of the Arctic Council is, however, conducted within its six work-
ing groups (WGs):86 (i) the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP); (ii) the 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP); (iii) the Conservation of 
Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); (iv) the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response (EPPR); (v) the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) 
as well as (vi) the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).87 For exam-
ple, the PAME WG adopted the non-binding Framework for a Pan-Arctic Network 
Of Marine Protected Areas,88 and, more recently, issued the Arctic Protected Areas: 
Indicator Report.89 Given its nature as an intergovernmental high-level forum, the 
 Arctic Council lacks, however, the competence to adopt legally binding decisions 
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or instruments,90 which is why the Council has, for the most part, functioned as 
“a forum for study and discussions”91 of Arctic issues, and, in this regard, fulfilled a 
“monitoring and assess-ment [sic] role” through its WGs.92 Yet, the Arctic Council 
has occasionally also fulfilled “a decision-shaping role or a limited regulatory role.”93
Amidst concerns that the current governance framework for the Arctic Ocean 
was inadequate to respond to regulatory challenges, there has been much debate on 
whether a regional treaty for the Arctic Ocean, potentially modelled after the  Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS), was necessary.94 Proposals were put forward to transform 
the Arctic Council from a high-level intergovernmental forum into an international 
organisation based on a legally binding treaty.95 Responding to such suggestions, the 
Arctic coastal States (Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian  Federation and the 
United States of America), which are commonly referred to as the Arctic 5, adopted 
the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration.96 In the latter declaration, the Arctic 5 stated that there 
was “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to gov-
ern the Arctic Ocean.”97 Instead, they pointed to “an extensive international legal 
framework […] [applicable] to the Arctic Ocean,” specifically emphasising the law 
of the sea.98 In addition, the Arctic 5 emphasised the role of the Arctic Council for 
Arctic Ocean governance and expressed their commitment “to continue to contrib-
ute actively to the work of the Arctic Council.”99 
While the Arctic 5 thus opposed any “new comprehensive international regime” for 
the Arctic Ocean in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration,100 they adopted, together with the 
other member States of the Arctic Council,101 issue-specific agreements on various 
topics, such as scientific cooperation, search and rescue and oil spill preparedness.102 
These agreements were negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council,103 and 
some commentators have underlined the role of the Council, through e.g. EPPR, in 
facilitating the implementation of some of these agreements.104 This has prompted 
Molenaar to conceptualise the policy-shaping and treaty facilitation role of the Arc-
tic Council in terms of the “Arctic Council System” (ASC).105 The idea of an ACS, 
which offers a useful way of capturing the governance role of the Arctic Council, 
does not, however, capture developments that have been occurring outside of the 
sphere of influence of the Council.106 One example of this is the 2018 Agreement 
to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAOF 
Agreement),107 which was not negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, 
but instead by the Arctic 5, together with China, Iceland, Japan, South Korea and 
the European Union (EU).108 
In light of the above-mentioned concerns that the current governance framework 
for the Arctic Ocean was inadequate, the Arctic Council established two Task Forces 
on Arctic Marine Cooperation (TFAMC). The first was set up in 2015 in order “to 
assess future needs for a regional seas program or other mechanism, as appropriate, 
for increased cooperation in Arctic marine areas.”109 In its final report, TFAMC I 
identified various “functional needs” for Arctic marine cooperation,110 noting the 
potential of “further exploring the establishment of a new Arctic Council subsidiary 
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body, in combination with complementary enhancements to existing Arctic Coun-
cil mechanisms.”111 Interestingly, TFAMC I explicitly mentioned the BBNJ process 
in its final report by noting that TFAMC was “cognizant that the commitments 
our respective governments undertake in global fora […] represent the standards 
against which our marine cooperation outcomes will be measured.”112 In 2017, 
TFAMC II was mandated by the Arctic Council to develop the terms of reference 
[…] for a possible new subsidiary body as well as “recommendations for comple-
mentary enhancements to existing Arctic Council mechanisms.”113 Yet, the SAOs 
decided in 2018 to limit the mandate of  TFAMC II to recommendations only.114 The 
process of developing a new subsidiary body under the Arctic Council has conse-
quently stagnated. This notwithstanding, the recommendations for complementary 
enhancement of the Arctic Council’s institutions included setting up “a SAO-based 
mechanism to guide the marine work of the Arctic Council and improve coordina-
tion on marine issues in the Arctic Council.”115 Thus, despite insistent questions on 
“whether the current institutional set-up of the Council will be sufficient to address 
future challenges and ambitions,”116 there has been no political will to strengthen 
the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council so far. Nor has there been much 
enthusiasm among the Arctic States to adopt a comprehensive regional treaty for the 
Arctic Ocean. Against this backdrop, the next section reflects on the implications of 
the likely future applicability of the ILBI to some parts of the Arctic Ocean with a 
specific emphasis on the role of the Arctic Council vis-à-vis the ILBI.
4 The Arctic Council and the ILBI 
The ILBI is envisioned to apply to “areas beyond national jurisdiction,” i.e. the high 
seas and the Area.117 Hence, the ILBI will apply to the considerable high seas portion 
of the Arctic Ocean and the Area, although the exact extent of the latter remains an 
open question,118 since the Arctic coastal States are still in the process of delineating 
their respective outer continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles pursuant to Article 
76 UNCLOS.119
As mentioned in the introduction, Koivurova and Caddell characterised the “ILBI 
as a potential milestone in Arctic governance,”120 and more specifically argued that 
the Arctic Council “may provide particularly fertile ground for achieving the objec-
tives of the ILBI within this region.”121 Others, by contrast, have urged institutional 
developments to ensure effective Arctic conservation and the continuing relevance 
of the Arctic Council vis-à-vis the ILBI.122 Since the BBNJ negotiations are ongo-
ing, it is too early to assess whether and to what extent the Arctic Council will 
indeed play an active role in achieving the objectives of the ILBI, which will likely 
be “the long-term conservation and sustainable use of marine [BBNJ] […] through 
effective implementation of the relevant provisions of the [LOS] Convention and 
further international cooperation and coordination.”123 Yet, two intertwined points 
will likely have a bearing on the eventual role the Arctic Council will or can play: the 
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institutional structure of the ILBI and the way the ILBI will define its relation with 
other instruments, frameworks and bodies.
The first point targeting the institutional structure of the ILBI is, in fact, a question 
of whether the agreement will adopt a global, regional or – perhaps most likely – some 
form of hybrid approach.124 As stressed above, Arctic coastal States have consistently 
resisted a global legal and governance framework for BBNJ, favouring by contrast a 
regional approach that shall not undermine existing regional and sectoral bodies.125 
A similar position is held by some of the other members of the Arctic Council (nota-
bly Iceland) and by States with an “active Arctic interest,”126 such as China, Japan 
and South Korea.127 The second point relates to how the ILBI will define its norma-
tive and institutional relationship with other instruments, frameworks and bodies. 
In this respect, a key question is whether the Arctic Council could be regarded as a 
“relevant regional body” which shall not be undermined by the future ILBI. It is to 
this question that we now turn.
In its current form, Article 4(3) of the revised draft text uses the wording relevant 
global, regional, subregional and sectoral bodies. This begs two questions: first, whether 
the Arctic Council can be subsumed under the term bodies. Second, if the Arctic 
Council can be considered a body for the purposes of the ILBI, a follow-up question 
is then whether the Arctic Council is a relevant body, and whether relevance is an 
all or nothing question or whether relevance may relate to certain functions only (as 
discussed in section 4.2). 
While the question of whether the Arctic Council could be subsumed under the 
term body has not yet received much attention, it was observed that the Arctic Coun-
cil lacks “legal personality or formal status as an international organi[s]ation,” which 
could mean that “it is highly doubtful, at least prima facie, that it could be considered 
as one of the [relevant] bodies” the ILBI should not undermine.128 Others have 
observed that “[g]iven that the ILBI will prefer to cooperate with (or at least not 
undermine) regional mechanisms, there appears to be particular scope to advance 
the four thematic priorities of the ILBI through the Arctic Council.”129 Though, on 
the basis of this observation, it is doubtful whether it is possible to derive any con-
clusive argument about whether the Arctic Council could qualify as a body in the 
sense of the UNGA Resolution 72/249. Additionally, neither the latter resolution, 
nor Article 4(3) of the revised draft text define the term “bodies.” According to the 
Oxford Dictionary, the term body has various meanings.130 The first meaning refers 
to “[t]he physical structure, […] of a person or an animal.”131 The more fitting mean-
ing in the current context would, however, be “[a]n organized group of people with 
a common purpose or function.”132 Here, the Oxford Dictionary mentions as two 
examples “a regulatory body” as well as “international bodies of experts.”133
Given the lack of a definition of a body in the revised draft text and the broadness 
of the ordinary meaning of the term, the Arctic Council, as a “high level forum,” 
could perhaps be considered as a body. This conclusion can be supported by the fact 
that both UNGA Resolution 72/249 and Article 4(3) of the draft text refer to the 
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term body and not international organisation. Unlike the notion of body, interna-
tional organisation is a term of art in international law.134 For instance, Article 2(a) 
of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organi[s]ations 
(Draft Articles) defines the term international organisation for the purpose of the 
Draft Articles as “an organi[s]ation established by a treaty or other instrument 
governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personal-
ity.”135 Since the Arctic Council was not established by a treaty or other instrument 
governed by international law and lacks legal personality, in principle it would not 
qualify as an international organisation.136 The fact that Article 4(3) of the revised 
draft text does not use the term international organisation but the notion of body 
instead appears, however, to support the view that the Arctic Council could be sub-
sumed under the notion of regional body in the sense of Article 4(3) of the revised 
draft text. 
As mentioned in section 2, the notion of not undermining relevant instruments, 
frameworks and bodies presumably emerged during the work of the BBNJ WG 
in relation to the perceived need, on the part of some delegations, to “safeguard” 
the Fish Stocks Agreement and the broader framework of international fisheries 
law, including regional fisheries management bodies.137 This could point to a more 
restricted meaning of the term body, in the sense of a regulatory body with legal per-
sonality under international law.138 In that respect, while not conclusive, the history 
of the emergence of the term body may be of some interpretative relevance as part 
of the drafting history.139 
Additionally, the notion of not undermining was at first one of a constellation of 
concepts that were discussed during the BBNJ WG sessions.140 In fact, the Appen-
dix to a 2014 letter from the Co-Chairs of the BBNJ WG to the President of the 
General Assembly indicates that the discussion focused on the broader notion that 
a potential new instrument “[s]hould not undermine, duplicate or change existing 
instruments.”141 Other terms and formulations capturing similar concerns were also 
included, such as the idea that a new treaty would need to “[r]espect and comple-
ment the existing mandates of relevant organi[s]ations and avoid duplications” or 
should not “subordinate existing instruments.”142 Some delegations further empha-
sised how “[d]ecision-making for regional and sectoral activities should remain with 
the relevant regional and sectoral organi[s]ations.”143 During the BBNJ WG, the 
focus thus seemed to have been related to avoid interfering with the decision-making 
of regional organisations or duplicating or changing existing instruments, and both 
terms seem to indicate a specific legal basis that may exclude informal arrangements 
or fora. However, as already mentioned, the terminology shifted during the BBNJ 
process from the original reference to organisations in the BBNJ WG to the subse-
quent term body. This raises a question of whether the terminological shift indicates 
that the later use of the term body captures the intention of deliberately broadening 
the scope of the concept of not undermining to bodies other than international 
organisations. 
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Unless the future ILBI specifically clarifies the meaning and definitional scope of 
the term body, it may seem reasonable to consider that the choice of the term body 
as opposed to international organisation, in light of the broad ordinary meaning of 
the former, may support the interpretation that the Arctic Council can be regarded 
as a body for the purposes of the not undermining clause. 
Yet, even if the Arctic Council can be considered a body for the purposes of 
the ILBI, a follow-up question is whether the Council would also be a relevant 
body. There are two questions to address in this respect: first, the subject matter 
relevance; second, the regulatory relevance. As for the first question, the Arctic 
Council’s mandate encompasses, as mentioned above, cooperation, coordination 
and interaction on common Arctic issues, particularly issues of sustainable devel-
opment and environmental protection. As such, it overlaps with the overall objec-
tives of the ILBI – the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity 
– and with at least one of its substantive topics, that is, ABMTs, including MPAs. 
For example, as noted above, the PAME WG of the Arctic Council adopted the 
non-binding Framework for a Pan-Arctic Network of Marine Protected Areas,144 and, 
more recently, issued the Arctic Protected Areas: Indicator Report.145 We can thus say, 
with a degree of safety, that the Arctic Council is, from a subject matter perspective 
and with particular regard to the question of MPAs, a relevant body from the per-
spective of the subject matter.
The second question targeting the regulatory relevance is more complex. 
Article 6(3) of the revised draft text envisages, albeit in bracketed text, that “States 
Parties shall cooperate to establish new global, regional and sectoral bodies, where 
necessary.” More specifically in relation to the topic of ABMTs, the revised draft text 
also envisions, again in bracketed text, that “States Parties shall cooperate to establish 
[…] an instrument, framework and body” with the capacity to establish ABMTs in 
case “there is no relevant legal instrument or framework or relevant global, regional, 
subregional or sectoral body” with such capacity.146 It is thus fairly clear that the 
focus on regional bodies hinges on their regulatory capacity, i.e. on their compe-
tence to adopt specific conservation measures, such as, the designation of MPAs. In 
regions where a body with such competence does not exist, the ILBI envisions, albeit 
tentatively at this stage, the creation of such body. By contrast, the Arctic Council, 
as a high-level intergovernmental forum for cooperation, does not have competence 
to designate MPAs, adopt conservation measures or any legally binding decisions.147 
Thus, it seems to be excluded from the scope of these provisions, which in turn leads 
to the consideration that, even though it may be considered a body (or a framework, 
for that matter),148 it may not be a relevant body for the purposes of the not under-
mining clause. In other words, even if the Arctic Council could, in abstract, be con-
sidered a body for the purposes of the ILBI, there would not be much to undermine 
in practice, given that it can neither adopt any regulatory measure, such as MPAs, 
nor impose legally binding obligations on its members. However, there may be more 
to consider. For example, if the ILBI requires or encourages the establishment of 
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bodies with regulatory competence in relation to the designation of MPAs in regions 
where no such bodies exist, this could re-start the stagnated process to develop a 
subsidiary body under the Arctic Council, given that Arctic States have historically 
favoured a regional approach, and have been consistently focused in their role as 
stewards of the Arctic. Additionally, the lack of regulatory competence does not nec-
essarily entail the lack of relevance in other respects. In fact, a potential further 
question relates to the relevance of the Arctic Council with respect to the process 
of identification of MPAs, a role already fulfilled today. Relatedly, one could ask 
whether the Arctic Council could be undermined by the operation of one of the 
envisioned bodies to be adopted under the ILBI, namely a scientific and advisory 
body that may have a mandate that overlaps with that of the Arctic Council. 
One such question has been raised in the context of the CAOF Agreement and, 
in particular, in terms of Article 14(3) of the CAOF Agreement, which stipulates 
that “[t]his Agreement shall not undermine nor conflict with the role and mandate 
of any existing international mechanism relating to fisheries management.” Such 
international mechanisms relating to fisheries management would arguably include 
scientific advisory bodies, as confirmed by the Norwegian Government’s proposal 
to Parliament to ratify the CAOF Agreement.149 With respect to Article 14, this 
proposal observes that the CAOF Agreement shall not undermine150 existing inter-
national fisheries management mechanisms,151 and mentions specifically the Inter-
national Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).152 The reference to the ICES 
is interesting for our purposes. While the ICES, unlike the Arctic Council, is an 
international organisation under international law, both, nonetheless, provide scien-
tific knowledge that needs to be operationalised by competent international bodies. 
As the question of not undermining is thus in the context of the CAOF Agreeement 
also linked to scientific advisory bodies, the overlap or conflict of competence may 
be related to Article 4 of the CAOF Agreement, which sets out to establish a Joint 
Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring. It is then, perhaps, reasonable to 
raise the question also in relation to any overlap of mandate between the Arctic 
Council (as such or with more specific reference to one of its WGs) and a scien-
tific body to be established under the ILBI, notwithstanding the fact that the Arctic 
Council is not an international organisation. In this context, it is, however, reason-
able to consider that the question at stake is really one of duplication of functions 
(and thus also of efficiency), rather than one of undermining stricto sensu, though 
duplication is one of the elements of the notion of not undermining, at least accord-
ing to some commentators.153 This consideration may be also strengthened if one 
looks at the outcome document of the 2017 UN Ocean Conference, “Our Ocean, 
Our Future: Call for Action.”154 The document, in fact, affirms “the need to enhance 
the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources by implementing 
international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.” It further emphasises how “actions to implement [Sustainable Development] 
Goal 14 should be in accordance with, reinforce and not duplicate or undermine 
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existing legal instruments, arrangements, processes, mechanisms or entities” and 
reiterates how UNCLOS “provides the legal framework for the conservation and 
sustainable use of oceans and their resources.”155
The ILBI may not only determine institutional relations and cooperation at a 
general level, but also more specifically. For example, Article 49 of the revised draft 
text, which establishes a Scientific and Technical Body, specifies in its current form 
that such a body “may also draw on appropriate advice from [existing arrangements, 
such as the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environ-
mental Protection], [relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global, 
regional, subregional and sectoral bodies], as well as other scientists and experts, as 
may be required.” The language used in this draft article points to operative words 
such as coordination and cooperation, rather than undermining. In this respect, 
Article 49 of the revised draft text serves as another example that the draft text 
appears to be moving away from a narrow focus/approach on not undermining and 
shifts rather towards focusing on coherence, cooperation and coordination between 
its different institutional components and other relevant (regional) bodies. This shift 
of focus has been, indeed, encouraged by the existing literature,156 and also seems to 
be a more reasonable approach for achieving the overall objectives of the ILBI and 
UNCLOS, of which the ILBI shall be an implementing agreement. Indeed, a similar 
shift towards focusing on cooperation and coordination, instead of not undermining, 
has, in part, occurred in the context of the CAOF Agreement.157
5 Conclusion
This article has reflected on the role of the Arctic Council vis-à-vis a future ILBI 
and, in doing so, explored the question of whether the Arctic Council can be con-
sidered one of the bodies that the ILBI shall not undermine. This question captures 
the intersection of several important aspects of the negotiations. First, the ques-
tion of not undermining, which remains central to the negotiations and is far from 
being settled. Second, and more broadly, the institutional arrangement of the ILBI, 
and relatedly the debate on whether the ILBI should have a prominently global 
or regional approach. Third, these aspects are concretised in relation to the Arctic, 
which is particularly significant vis-à-vis the BBNJ negotiations (i) given its ecologi-
cal vulnerability; (ii) because important legal and governance gaps exist; and finally, 
(iii) because Arctic States have consistently preferred a regional approach to BBNJ 
governance throughout the BBNJ process.158 
The Arctic Ocean has not been devoted specific attention at the BBNJ negotiations 
thus far, although some scholars have started exploring the potential implications of 
the likely future applicability of the ILBI to those parts of the Arctic Ocean that lie 
beyond national jurisdiction. Since the BBNJ negotiations are still ongoing, it is too 
early to precisely assess the role of the Arctic Council vis-à-vis the ILBI. Its role will, 
however, likely depend on several elements: (i) the institutional structure and design 
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of the ILBI; (ii) whether the Arctic Council could be regarded as a relevant regional 
body, and in relation to which function; and (iii) how the ILBI will determine its 
institutional relationship with relevant bodies. However, we have attempted to raise 
some of these questions and discuss possible ways to answer them in light of the 
available documents, such as the revised draft text. In this respect, the article has first 
explored the meaning of the concept of undermining, as well as the (limited) existing 
literature that has attempted to interpret the term. The article has subsequently dis-
cussed the Arctic Council, especially its structure and its mandate, in order to assess 
whether it can be considered as a body for the purposes of the not undermining 
clauses contained in the latest draft text of the ILBI, albeit partly still in tentative 
and bracketed form. The question, however, has several dimensions. Indeed, even if 
the Arctic Council can formally be considered as a body, it still needs to be a relevant 
one. While the answer to the first question may well be positive, the answer to the 
second is negative, to the extent that the Arctic Council has, for instance, neither 
the competence to designate MPAs nor to adopt any legally binding measures made 
applicable therein. A different answer may be given if one focuses on relevance with 
respect to a more limited function. A brief illustration was given in relation to the role 
of the Arctic Council and of its relevant WGs. This more limited role refers to the 
production of scientific knowledge that may be instrumental for identifying MPAs 
or to implement an ecosystem approach to the conservation of Arctic biodiversity. 
In this respect, the Arctic Council may function as a network of regional scientific 
bodies that feed into the ILBI and its overarching global bodies, thus contributing 
in a coherent, cooperative and coordinated manner to the overall achievement of 
the global goals of ocean governance. This integration would, moreover, build on 
the networks of collaboration that the different WGs of the Arctic Council already 
participate in.159 Additionally, should the ILBI require the establishment of regional 
bodies able to designate MPAs in regions where there are no such bodies, this might 
re-start the stagnated process to develop a subsidiary body under the Arctic Council. 
In this sense, new life could be infused into the project of enhanced marine Arctic 
cooperation that fell short of its ambitions. 
Ultimately, the very focus on the notion of not undermining may be counterpro-
ductive for the ILBI and for ocean governance more broadly insofar as it emphasises 
conflicts of competence rather than synergies. Indeed, too stringent an interpreta-
tion of the notion of not undermining, combined with a broad understanding of the 
term body, could stifle the capacity of the ILBI to effectively achieve its objectives 
and to implement UNCLOS at the outset, which hinges to a larger extent on its 
ability to “improve upon the status quo.”160
Yet, the ILBI already contains some language that focuses on the positive dimen-
sions of coherence, coordination and cooperation, and it would be useful if the 
future draft texts for the ILBI would further strengthen this shift in focus towards 
synergies to frame the relationship between the ILBI and other relevant instruments 
and bodies. Then, the key issue would be to address how to coordinate the activities 
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of instruments and bodies with overlapping or similar competences so as to achieve 
what are ultimately the overarching goals of biodiversity conservation and of pro-
tection and preservation of the marine environment enshrined in UNCLOS and 
the CBD.161 Some commentators have begun indicating some ways to effectively 
shift the focus,162 but much work remains to be done, especially in terms of how to 
integrate this shift coherently throughout the ILBI and how to ensure that this shift 
gathers consensus among negotiators. This task clearly exceeds the scope of this arti-
cle, however, we hope this article is a contribution in that direction.
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